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Abstract. Trust between transaction partners in cyberspace has come to be considered a distinct possibility.
In this article the focus is on the conditions for its creation by way of assuming, not inferring trust. After a
survey of its development over the years (in the writings of authors like Luhmann, Baier, Gambetta, and
Pettit), this mechanism of trust is explored in a study of personal journal blogs. After a brief presentation of
some technicalities of blogging and authors’ motives for writing their diaries, I try to answer the question,
‘Why do the overwhelming majority of web diarists dare to expose the intimate details of their lives to the
world at large?’ It is argued that the mechanism of assuming trust is at play: authors simply assume that
future visitors to their blog will be sympathetic readers, worthy of their intimacies. This assumption then may
create a self-fulﬁlling cycle of mutual admiration. Thereupon, this phenomenon of blogging about one’s
intimacies is linked to Calvert’s theory of ‘mediated voyeurism’ and Mathiesen’s notion of ‘synopticism’. It is
to be interpreted as a form of ‘empowering exhibitionism’ that reaﬃrms subjectivity. Various types of
‘synopticon’ are distinguished, each drawing the line between public and private diﬀerently. In the most
‘radical’ synopticon blogging proceeds in total transparency and the concept of privacy is declared obsolete;
the societal gaze of surveillance is proudly returned and nulliﬁed. Finally it is shown that, in practice, these
conceptions of blogging are put to a severe test, while authors often have to cope with known people from
‘real life’ complaining, and with ‘trolling’ strangers.
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Introduction
My depression is atypical, which means that I
oversleep and I overeat and my motivation is the
pits. I’ve lost interest in everything I used to adore; I
can’t even concentrate on watching television for
more than 5 minutes! I’ve become extremely sensi-
tive and over-emotional and I’ve isolated myself
[from] all ofmy friends. Furthermore,my self esteem
is as low as it can be. I’ve gained thirty-ﬁve pounds,
inducing a panic that led me to disordered eating. I
suﬀer from chronic pain and headaches. […] I’m
either sleeping or eating or sitting in the tub with the
shower water running and crying my eyes out.
(Avernales, a 21 year old woman suﬀering from
depression since she was 18, in the proﬁle on her
online diary entitled ‘Take back my life: It’s NOW
or NEVER’, started on 22 March 2007; retrieved
May 2007 from http://avernales.livejournal.com/
proﬁle; some time later, this journal was ‘deleted
and purged’)
In the last decade many scholars have come to
appreciate the very social character of virtual rela-
tionships on the Internet. In particular, trust between
transaction partners in cyberspace is not to be ruled
out. The argument about trust concerns both its
existence and its genesis. On the one hand, seemingly
against all the odds, relations characterized by trust
may be observed between virtual partners. On the
other, such trust may be created in an unorthodox
fashion: trust is simply assumed, not inferred from
available evidence. It is upon this mechanism of cre-
ation that this article focuses (in the ﬁrst part to
follow below). More particularly, it is shown that
assuming trust is the basic mode of operation in
online diaries. Their revelation of intimacies is pred-
icated on the assumption that their readers have no ill
intentions and will respect their conﬁdences.
Assuming trust: A survey
A brief survey of how this unorthodox argument
about the genesis of trust has developed over the
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years may be useful. The following lines of research
may be distinguished – all of them originating in
pre-Internet times and thus relating to ‘real life’
only. In the 1980s and 1990s the concept of trust
experienced a mini-revival in several disciplines.
Philosophers, economists and social scientists star-
ted to pay attention to the concept of trust once
again. Niklas Luhmann was arguably one of the
ﬁrst to do so (Luhmann 1968), although his work
was only taken up much later. Subsequently,
important analyses were contributed by Annette
Baier (1986; 1992), Diego Gambetta (1988), and
Philip Pettit (1995). Their concept of trust is
roughly comparable: reliance on the competence
and good intentions of other(s) in situations char-
acterized by vulnerability and high risk. More
particularly, all these authors pondered the possi-
bilities of trust relations starting not by inference,
but by simple assumption. An act of trust in this
vein was interpreted as an investment that it was
hoped would pay oﬀ. By way of an introduction to
the issue, let us focus on Gambetta’s analysis.
Echoing Luhmann’s conception of Vertrauen in
Vertrauen (Luhmann 1968, p. 85 ﬀ.), Gambetta
formulated the question: ‘Can we trust trust?’ He
argued that if we do not test our trust of the other
by ‘acting as if one trusted’, we shall never be able
to discover whether the other is to be trusted or
not. By trusting nevertheless, we encourage the
other to commit himself to the relationship.
Therefore, ‘the concession of trust […] can generate
the very behaviour which might logically seem to
be its precondition’ (all quotations from Gambetta
1988, p. 234).
Following this line of inquiry, Debra Meyerson,
Karl Weick, and Roderick Kramer conducted a sur-
vey of the literature on temporary groups that come
together in real life to perform a collective task
(Meyerson et al. 1996). Why do these ‘temporary
systems act as if trust were present’, while ‘their his-
tories seem to preclude its development’ (Meyerson
et al. 1996, p. 167)? They tentatively concluded that
in such groups either trust was assumed at the outset
and acted upon, or trust was not forthcoming at all.
The phenomenon was aptly dubbed ‘swift trust’. The
dynamics of tight interdependencies between partici-
pants, high risks, and high time pressure were sup-
posed to account for it. Shortly after, Sirkka
Jarvenpaa and Dorothy Leidner transferred this
research agenda into cyberspace (Jarvenpaa and
Leidner 1999). They explored whether trust could
develop between members of virtual work teams that
did not have any face-to-face interaction. Studying
teams of students in cyberspace, unknown to each
other, they found that trust did indeed develop in half
of them, and it was only by assuming trust that the
genesis of trust had a chance. So the phenomenon of
trusting trust – without apparent reason – had now
also been identiﬁed in virtual life. From this study
onwards, several authors have continued to analyse
and comment on this very phenomenon. Patricia
Wallace tracks the development of trust across a
variety of virtual settings (Wallace 1999, in particular
p. 86), and John Weckert analyses the creation of
online trust by choosing to act as if one sees others as
trustworthy (Weckert 2005, p. 113).
This line of research, however, can be strength-
ened and speciﬁed more clearly by returning to the
authors involved in the mini-revival of research on
trust. On the one hand, Baier and Pettit alert us to
the fact that, when speciﬁc clues about the other(s)
are lacking, people do not rely on trust without any
considerations at all. They usually estimate, in a
more general sense, whether or not the obtaining
‘climate of trust’ is conducive to trust moves
(cf. Baier 1992; Pettit 1995). On the other hand, the
mechanism underlying an assumption of trust – if
any – can be clariﬁed. Luhmann analyses the act of
trusting as a risky investment (Vorleistung) that has
normative consequences. While it is incurred vol-
untarily, it is considered a merit and commands
esteem (Achtung) from the other (‘supererogatorische
Leistung’). As a consequence, a normative claim
upon the other develops to reply in kind (Luhmann
1968, p. 55). Luhmann refers to the analogy of a
gift: a gift, whether small or large, invites a gift
in return (Luhmann 1968, p. 56). And so it is for
an act of trust (which may, of course, involve
the giving of presents). Therefore, one may have
Vertrauen in Vertrauen and just go ahead (Luhmann
1968, p. 91).
Some time later, without explicitly taking Luhmann
into account (!), Philip Pettit developed his own
theory about two mechanisms of trust (Pettit 1995).
Trust – in the sense of ‘dynamic, interactive, trusting
reliance involving high risk’ – will usually be based on
a belief that the other is trustworthy (‘primary trust’).
Another, more subtle mechanism of trust (‘secondary
trust’) is based on the belief that the other cherishes
my esteem and will therefore reply to an act of trust
in kind (‘trust-responsiveness’). It is a gesture that
motivates the other to perform well in return. Pettit
analyses the act of trust as a risky investment that
should pay oﬀ as long as the trustee does not want to
forfeit the chance to reap the esteem of the trustor.
As can be seen, both Luhmann and Pettit put dif-
ferent emphases, but refer to the self-same mechanism
of assuming, not inferring trust. One may have trust
in the mechanism of trusting others, without any
concrete evidence of trustworthiness being available.
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Central to the mechanism is the exchange of esteem.
Taken together, I would argue that the issue of
trusting trust (Gambetta, Pettit), Vertrauen in
Vertrauen (Luhmann), or reliance on trust (which
Baier claims to be the more accurate wording; Baier
1992, p. 138) has been squarely put on the research
agenda. A wide range of authors from diﬀerent
backgrounds seem to converge on this.
In a recent article (de Laat 2005) I explored whe-
ther this mechanism of assuming trust had any
bearing on relationships in cyberspace. While in Pettit
(2004) it was argued that it was impossible for virtual
trust to develop and it was bound to remain a
(dangerous) illusion, I came to the opposite conclu-
sion. In a wide range of contexts, trust does empiri-
cally seem to obtain between pure virtuals. Moreover,
while primary trust often does not suﬃce as the whole
explanation, I argued that secondary trust does seem
to play a vital role in its genesis. In order to arrive at
this conclusion I explored market transactions, task
groups, and non-task groups focusing on recreation
and group support. The technological means
employed by these groups were mailings lists and
websites. Recently, a new technological mode of
communication has emerged: web logs, or blogs for
short. Insofar as these are used to express personal
and intimate matters of one’s life (online diaries),
they would seem to be a useful area to perform a
detailed study of the phenomenon of assuming trust
in cyberspace.
Blogs
Routinely, blogs are deﬁned as websites on which
dated entries are frequently uploaded and presented
in reverse chronological order. Comments about any
subject, of any length, can be presented to the world
in this format. When, in 1999, technology had
evolved suﬃciently and blogs became available as
hosted services (provided by Blogger, LiveJournal,
and the like), their numbers rose sharply. Currently,
millions of blogs can be found in cyberspace. To
varying degrees, blogs may be equipped with speciﬁc
technical features (cf. Herring et al. 2004). Archives
may be set up containing older entries than the ones
displayed; they are mostly searchable, too. ‘Perma-
links’ allow visitors to link directly to any individual
blogpost. A list of links to other bloggers (‘blog
roll’) may be presented. Badges signal aﬃliations of
interest. Relations of friendship are usually dis-
played in a two-way fashion: bloggers may list blogs
of those they consider their friends, as well as the
blogs of those who consider them to be their friend
(without reciprocity implied). Sometimes (though
not often; Herring et al. 2004, note 14), comments
are allowed – even invited – on individual posts, or
on the blog as a whole only. ‘Trackbacks’ alert
blogger A that, on blog B, (s)he is being com-
mented on.
Bloggers often have technological options avail-
able to manage their privacy (cf. Kozlov 2004).
With many hosts, one may install restricted circles
of participants. With Vox (SixApart), for example,
apart from blogging in total secrecy (cf. classical
diary) or for the world at large, one can commu-
nicate within a circle of relatives, and a circle of
friends. Accepted members may be granted reading
rights only, or writing rights as well. Moreover,
blog owners may ‘manage’ incoming comments in
order to keep interactions smooth (comments can
be screened from view, be temporarily frozen, or
even deleted; anonymous comments can be turned
away).
What are the authors blogging about? According
to Blood (2000), it all started with ﬁlter style blogs
that made a personal selection of interesting sites
available to readers. A kind of alternative public
sphere was being developed. Thereafter, personal
journal blogs started to appear, in which authors
chronicle their lives. Such diaries are by now the
main type of blog, at least in the US (about 70%; cf.
statistics in Herring et al. 2004). Other types are k-
logs (for sharing of knowledge) and blogs for artistic
purposes (Herring et al. 2004). At the same time it
has been found that, available options to install
more intimate circles notwithstanding, the over-
whelming majority of blogs are publicly accessible.
Bloggers blog for the world at large. Moreover,
bloggers’ identities are apparent most of the time,
while they provide a name or a pseudonym, as well
as many personal details (Herring et al. 2004;
Schmidt 2006, p. 78).
It is upon these personal, publicly available online
diaries that I focus from now on. The analysis that
follows is based on the few existing academic studies
of diaristic blogs, and on a cursory reading of a
random sample of online diaries themselves. More-
over, my analysis purports to apply mainly to such
blogs in countries from Western Europe and North
America. For one thing, most blogs originate there
(at least until recently). For another, the cul-
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tural phenomena involved – of trust, privacy, and
intimacy – are bound to have diﬀerent meanings and
diﬀerent implications elsewhere.1
Online diaries
Online diaries usually chronicle intimacies of both the
soul and the ﬂesh (cf. the opening quotation above,
from one diary out of many). Their mostly solitary
authors enter upon a journey of self-discovery and
intellectual self-reliance (Blood 2000). Why do blog-
gers engage in such adventures? What are they
expecting to gain from their public eﬀorts? Although
research is scarce on this recent phenomenon, most
accounts converge on the following motives
(cf. Miller and Sheperd 2004, leaning heavily on
Calvert 2000; Schmidt 2006, Chap. 4). On the one
hand, diaries involve a personal project centred on
the self: the blog is a means of self-clariﬁcation and
self-validation. By sustained writing about the events,
thoughts, and emotions of one’s life, one is able to
discover and develop who one ‘is’. On the other hand,
there is a need to get to know others, to develop a
community of sympathizers. Otherwise there would
be no point in publishing one’s diary in the open.
Moreover, these community relationships can be
consciously ‘managed’ with the options for selective
linking and commenting mentioned above. In this
way, bloggers position themselves in the bloggers’
community (Blood 2000).
It can safely be assumed that online diarists are
moved by a combination of both motives, with some
tending towards the blog as a personal project, while
others incline towards the blog as a social project.
Furthermore, the two motives are intimately con-
nected: reﬂections upon the self are the entry ticket to
a potential new community, while the feedback from
the community may aﬀord a better grip on leading
one’s own personal life. As the French psychology
tradition phrases it so aptly (cf. Serfaty 2004, p. 92):
by externalizing one’s intimate life through self-
dramatization and/or theatricalization, one may be
more able to grasp and re-internalize elements of
one’s inner life. ‘Extimacy’ is in play (intimacy turned
inside out), a term coined by Jacques Lacan and
further developed by others like Jacques-Alain
Miller.
The ongoing dialectic is nicely worded by blogger
Jack in his entry ‘Why I Blog’ from 7 December 2005:
I am part of a community of bloggers, a part of the
overall blogosphere and at the same time I am also
part of many other groups within the blogosphere.
I am able to reach out and click someone. I can see
that there are others who are facing the same
challenges I face or have already overcome them. I
take strength in their words and I oﬀer my own.
Here at the keyboard I commune with others and
speak about my life. I oﬀer my insecurities and my
beliefs. I open my mind and try to learn about the
world around me. I am always searching and
seeking for new things to learn.
(retrieved from http://wwwjackbenimble.blogspot.
com/2005/12/why-i-blog.html)
Or asLunesse,who started adiary in 1996, expressed it:
I learned tons about others, of course. Lives I never
will live myself, thoughts I wouldn’t have come
across on my own. I have learned how to better
process and work through some things in my life as
a result of reading how others went through similar
things.
I also learned about myself, how open I really am,
and what about. I learned what it is like to take on
the responsibility of making your own life public,
and that of those around you, and how to deal with
doing that in a manner that is fair.
(interview from the year 2000; retrieved from
http://www.diaryhistoryproject.com/recollections/
1996_11_20.html)
Extimacy: Towards an explanation
So diarists are typically exposing many details of their
inner lives. Their motives seem clear enough. But why
do they take the risk of exposing themselves so
publicly to the world at large? Why this gamble of
extimacy on the scale of the Internet? Notice that
bloggers can play it safe if they prefer to do so.
Common sense would suggest that intimacies are
only to be revealed to ‘insiders’ who have already
1 Regarding the issue of quoting online personal jour-
nals, my position is the following. Some have argued that
publicly accessible records of electronic communities may
not be quoted for academic purposes without permission,
but only with consent (before the content has actually been
produced) from the author(s) involved (for a review of the
discussion see Bakardjieva and Feenberg 2000). I do not
think, however, that this ‘non-alienation principle’ applies
to the diaristic entries cited in this article. For one thing, the
web diaries involved are fully public at the time of writing,
or were so during their lifetime, without any technical
restrictions on entry. For another, many of the blogs used
have been incorporated in public archives, which were set
up precisely for the sake of research. I therefore felt free
to cite without permission, and include the authors’ names
as well.
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shown themselves to be trustworthy (‘primary trust’).
This would suggest diﬀerentiating the level of inti-
macy around several circles: intimate blogging for
insider circles (like relatives, or friends), more
cautious blogging for the world at large. Techni-
cally, such arrangements can be implemented now
(cf. above).
The astonishing reality, contrary to expectations,
is that most blogs are wholly public. One may argue
that ignorance about available privacy options might
be involved. Another feasible explanation is that
would-be bloggers have studied the blogging phe-
nomenon for a while, and come to the conclusion that
conﬁdence in public blogging is warranted (in the
Luhmannian sense: danger is perceived to be
involved, but not risk). It might also be supposed that
many diarists just unwittingly follow the example of
bloggers who started a diary before them.
Nevertheless, many bloggers are aware of the risks
of being in fully ‘open’ cyberspace. Relatives or
friends may start a quarrel about intimacies revealed,
and anonymous ‘trolls’ may start harassing one’s
blog. Why is it, then, that online diarists dare entrust
the intimacies of their daily lives to the world out
there? Considering the distinction between primary
and secondary trust as coined by Pettit (1995), which
mechanism of trust is in play? This question seems to
have an easy answer. Diarists have no indications
whatsoever about the trustworthiness of potential
visitors to their site. The more usual mechanism of
inferring trust cannot apply. I would argue, therefore,
that public blogging, if undertaken in consciousness
of the risks, is to be interpreted as a case of secondary
trust: authors simply assume that at least some others
out there will be moved by their display of intimacies
and react accordingly.
This is not to say that diarists have no clues what-
soever at their disposal when assuming trust. In a
general sense they can make an informed estimate of
the climate of trust prevailing in the blogging circles
they intend to become part of (cf. Baier 1992; Pettit
1995). Theymay have read other blogs, andmonitored
the comments on them –if any – for a while.Moreover,
theymay reﬂect on their own reactions to reading blogs
by other authors. Based on such observations, diarists
may with some conﬁdence conclude whether or not
speciﬁc blogging circles seem hospitable enough – in a
general sense – to tell all about themselves.
Pettit was drawn into his analysis of ‘trusting’
situations that revolve around assuming trust, while
he believes that it has normative implications that
have been overlooked. He points in particular to the
creativity and ubiquity of trust in civil society (Pettit
1995, Sect. IV). That is, trust may develop ex nihilo
in a great many social situations. The examples he
mentions and elaborates are the taxi passenger who
trusts the driver to get her to her destination by the
shortest possible route, and the new resident handing
over the house keys to his neighbours, trusting that
they will take care of the house. These social situa-
tions involve relations between two parties meeting
face-to-face.
I would argue that online diaries represent a quite
diﬀerent – and more complicated – trusting situation.
On the one hand, blogging would seem to be a less
frightening aﬀair. An author entrusts his/her intima-
cies to the world at large, not as a one-to-one but a
one-to-many relationship. Moreover, these spectators
are invisible and anonymous. In that sense, blogging
amounts to a generalized act of trust (addressing not
a speciﬁc stranger but a non-speciﬁc, invisible, mul-
titude of strangers). Engaging in such an act, sitting
safely behind one’s computer screen, would seem to
generate less angst than the situations that Pettit
discussed. On the other hand, blogging online also
has more frightening aspects in terms of trust. Blog-
ging is not a one-time display of trust but a contin-
uing one: a diary is an eﬀort to produce entries in a
continuous fashion (most blogs are updated every
day; Herring et al. 2004). Entries, moreover, are
recorded and archived: intimacies remain visible. So
blogging amounts to trusting the world out there day
after day, on a fully retrievable basis. The trusting
situation is more enduring than in Pettit’s cases.
With these comparative aspects in mind, we may
try to answer the question: Why does this arrange-
ment apparently work – most of the time? Why are
bloggers not ridiculed and taken advantage of – most
of the time? Part of the answer, I would argue, can be
found in the technological features of blogging. As
discussed above, trusting transforms into a general-
ized act of trust. This not only makes life easier on the
part of the sender – it also does so on the part of the
receiver. An act of generalized trust is much easier to
handle than the classical face-to-face approach.
Cyber-visitors can decide, unobserved while being
invisible behind their screens, whether or not to take
up the invitation.
On the one hand, they may like and admire the
prose, identify with its author, and turn to a daily
reading of the entries. Possibly they may also return
some comments of their own. If visitors provide feed-
back, this might be out of courtesy or respect. They
express their aﬃnity in return. Additionally – or solely
– they may be motivated by the prospect of earning
admiration from its author in return (trust-respon-
siveness). On the other hand, people stumbling on a
blog may also, of course, react otherwise. The blog’s
entries may not particularly appeal to them, or even
appal them. In those cases, abuse may seem a likely
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possibility. However, I would argue that they are more
likely just to ignore the blog’s existence. Two circum-
stances would seem to mitigate the danger of abuse.
For one thing, visitors may simply be civilized people,
not inclined to abuse their fellow-man. For another,
embarrassment or disgust may only arise if visitors
have at least glanced through some entries of the blog.
By that very fact they would seem to be implicated in
thematter. Iwould argue, though in amore speculative
vein, that as a result, if they harbour any self-respect,
abuse on their part is held at bay inasmuch as it would
make them feel awkward and ashamed. Remarkably,
trust-responsiveness (revolving around self-esteem)
may keep abuse in check (cf. also Pettit 1995, note 19).
So the normative power of trust (cf. Luhmann’s ter-
minology) supposedly is twofoldhere.On theonehand,
visitors who are ‘turned on’ by the diary may feel
compelled to comment on it; on the other, visitors who
are ‘turnedoﬀ’ by the blog involvedmay at any rate feel
obliged to refrain from opportunism.
This mechanism might also be phrased more
loosely as follows. An author imagines that at least
some people will feel sympathy for her blog entries,
while the remaining visitors, after a cursory glance,
will simply ignore her. Ill-will and associated ‘trolling’
are presumed to be out of the question. At this point
it might be useful to refer to a similar analysis, pro-
vided by Nicola Do¨ring, who reviewed the research
about the design of personal home pages (Do¨ring
2002). She observes that their authors – just like our
online diarists – update frequently (at least monthly)
and are involved in both a personal and a social
project. An overwhelming majority seem to present
authentic selves. She concludes that in revealing pri-
vate details about themselves, authors imagine
‘attentive and well-disposed’ others out there (Do¨ring
2002, Reception of …). This fantasy apparently pays
oﬀ: most comments they actually receive are sup-
portive and full of respect. Do¨ring does not specify if
and how the two phenomena might be connected. I
would of course speculate that the connection is
causal: precisely by imagining (i.e., assuming) a sup-
portive audience, at least part of that audience
eﬀectively becomes so. By assuming others to be
worthy of one’s intimacies, at least a number of them
will indeed become one’s intimate correspondents.
A self-reinforcing cycle of mutual admiration is created.
As one of many, Jesse Chan-Norris, blogging since
1997, aptly expresses his experiencing this cycle as
follows:
The notion of the anonymous, or semi-autono-
mous, audience is what, I think, drew me to the
online journal in the ﬁrst place. And to ﬁnally
know that people out there actually did read what I
had to say (and to know this from actual words
and not from access logs or something equally cold
and impersonal) was wonderful. Plus, there is
nothing quite like mutual admiration to really say
‘‘Ok, what you are doing is good and you should
keep on doing it.’’
(interview from 2000; retrieved from http://www.
diaryhistoryproject.com/recollections/1997_01_09.
html)
Nevertheless, this analysis of technological features
of computer-mediated communication facilitating
the trend towards exposure and gambling on trust
seems to be only part of the answer. At the same
time, more general cultural developments seem to be
involved. In the footsteps of Mathiesen (1997),
Calvert (2000), Miller and Sheperd (2004), and
Koskela (2004) I argue in the second part of this
article below, that the culture of ‘mediated exhibi-
tionism’ and ‘mediated voyeurism’ that has been
evolving during the last decades plays a central role.
This media(ted) culture, also denoted as ‘synoptic-
ism’, occupies a pivotal position in my argument.
On the one hand, it can be interpreted as a (per-
verse) reaction to the gradual erosion of privacy in
the 20th century. On the other, it is provoking a
countermovement against its alienating and
exploitative features that aims to turn exhibitionism
into a more authentic, empowering force. Diaristic
blogging can be interpreted as part of such
‘empowering exhibitionism’. Received notions of the
distinction between public and private, of privacy,
are challenged in the process. Several degrees of
empowerment are distinguished, as evidenced in the
design of the diaristic synopticon. It is shown,
ﬁnally, that living up to one’s conceptions in prac-
tice may be a hard task indeed.
Empowering exhibitionism
Clay Calvert is to be credited with coining the term
mediated voyeurism: the ‘consumption of revealing
images of and information about others’ apparently
real and unguarded lives’ (Calvert 2000, p. 2). For
decades now, several kinds of voyeurism have
become part and parcel of the programs broadcast on
TV. It has become normal to watch video images of
people being beaten up by the police (‘video ve´rite´’).
From Survivor and Big Brother to Jerry Springer
shows, we enjoy watching people in their apparently
genuine moments of anguish. With the Internet, the
trend is continuing; ‘girl-cam sites’ are a case in point.
Obviously, mediated voyeurism needs mediated
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exhibitionism: people – at least some of them – must
be willing to put themselves on show.
What are the origins of this voyeurist culture? Cal-
vert makes an interesting connection with the erosion
of privacy, characteristic of the late 20th century. We
live in a societywhere by now ‘we expect to bewatched,
and concomitantly, we expect to be able to watch
others’ (Calvert 2000, p. 94). So he argues that while
our personal privacy is no more, as a corollary we no
longer feel obliged to respect the privacy of others.
While we feel transparent, we declare the right to peer
into the lives of others. The Big Brother shows of today
are directly related to the Big Brother (or Panopticon)
tendencies of our information society at large.
A similar type of analysis has been provided by
Thomas Mathiesen. While actually borrowing from
Frank Henriksen, he proposed the term synopticism
for the phenomenon that through the modern mass
media ‘the many have been enabled to see the few – to
see the VIPs, the reporters, the stars, almost a new
class in the public sphere’ (Mathiesen 1997, p. 219).
Next to panopticism, he argued, the phenomenon of
synopticism has developed, together constituting a
‘viewer society’. Both mechanisms of control have
grown at increasing rates and in intimate interaction over
the last two centuries (Mathiesen 1997, pp. 218–225).
Voyeurism-cum-exhibitionism may be considered
roughly equivalent to synopticism thus deﬁned.
On the basis of both analyses we are able to
understand the phenomenon of online diaristic
blogging as a cultural life form. These web diarists are
exhibitionists exposing intimate details of their lives
on purpose; correspondingly, their readers are
engaged in voyeurism of a kind. However, is this
exhibitionism and voyeurism just a technological
extension of what was happening before? Is it to be
considered more of the same? According to Carolyn
Miller and Dawn Sheperd, who conducted a genre
analysis of blogs (Miller and Sheperd 2004), the
Internet in general oﬀers ever-increasing possibilities
for exposure in public: ‘On personal home pages and
message boards, in chatrooms and on listservs, and
most especially on blogs, people are sharing unprec-
edented amounts of personal information with total
strangers.’ So blogging is just the most recent addi-
tion to the Internet-enabled repertoire of exposure.
With this observation I have no disagreement.
In addition, however, these authors draw a con-
tinuous line from the (older) categories of exhibi-
tionism as discussed by Calvert to the (more recent)
Internet-related forms of exhibitionism (and Calvert
does precisely the same; Calvert 2000). I would argue,
on the contrary, that there is quite a diﬀerence
between them. Blogs, home pages and even webcam
sites do diﬀer from Big Brother and Jerry Springer
shows. Mediation is, of course, ever present. In the
older cases, however, the exposure is managed and
staged by commercial media engaged in their pro-
duction. The exhibitionists involved allow themselves
to be exploited. In the Internet cases, the individuals
concerned try to express themselves directly: self-
representation through their own medium is at stake.
This is a potentially liberating exercise. It is an eﬀort
to turn commercialized, exploitative exhibitionism
into a more authentic life form.
I propose to refer to this as empowering exhibition-
ism, in the footsteps of Hille Koskela who coined this
term some years ago. In Koskela (2004) she analysed
visual representations characteristic of reality shows,
mobile phones, and Internet webcams. She argued that
subjectivity can be reaﬃrmed if people choose to play a
more active role in the production of such images. A
prime example of such empowering exhibitionism was
the ‘Jennicam’ installed by Jennifer Ringley. I would
argue that this term can be transferred to the online
diaries that are the focus of this article. Bloggers, who
usually reveal many details of their intimate lives, may
be said to be engaged in empowering exhibitionism. I
would argue that diaristic blogs have even more
empowering potential than publicly visible webcams
portraying people’s lives. Besides online pictures and
images of a life they can also expose various texts.
Moreover, blogs may allow comments on entries,
comments on comments, and so on. With that, one’s
public life becomes ever more intertwined with the
public lives of others.
Koskela presents empowering exhibitionism as a
monolithic concept. I think it is more useful to dis-
tinguish between several degrees of empowerment.
Therefore, in the sequel I explore varieties of
empowerment among bloggers. It is argued that the
exhibitionism involved always amounts to an eﬀort to
create one’s own synopticon, i.e., to be the director of
one’s own theatre performance, revolving around
one’s personal life. Furthermore, if exhibitionism is
taken to extremes, it may aﬀect panopticism as well by
returning the gaze of surveillance and rendering it
potentially meaningless.
Public–private distinctions
Blogs are vehicles of empowerment. But in what ways
and to what extent is empowerment actually imple-
mented? Bloggers have to draw for themselves the ﬁne
lines between public and private. How is this inherent
tension being handled? If the metaphor of the synop-
ticon is taken literally, these questions can equivalently
be formulated as follows: Who is welcome in the
blogging synopticon, and onwhat terms?What kind of
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intimacies are being put on the online stage by the
director of the diary? While reﬂecting on the public–
private divide, bloggers turn out to make one impor-
tant distinction: between strangers in virtual life on the
one hand, and people they know in ‘real life’ (relatives,
friends, acquaintances, colleagues) on the other.
Remarkably, bloggers worry much more about the
latter than the former. To them, it is real life that may
complicate blogging considerably.
The various forms of empowerment will be shown
to revolve around two traditional notions of privacy
(for the following, cf. the overview in Introna 1997).
First the notion, as developed by Charles Fried, that
privacy is a necessary prerequisite for developing
intimate relationships. Relinquishing private infor-
mation step by step builds up involvement and
mutuality. The second conception involved – as
developed by James Rachels – focuses on the eﬃcient
diﬀerentiation of levels of privacy as appropriate to a
variety of social roles. Relational structures are sim-
pliﬁed while not burdened with superﬂuous and
possibly complicating information about the actors.
Not all bloggers have clear ideas about the matter,
of course. As far as these have crystallized, however,
basically three approaches to the distinction between
public and private could be identiﬁed from the
material at hand.2
First approach to privacy
In the ﬁrst approach, bloggers welcome people from
both virtual life (the unknowns) and real life (the
people they know). All are admitted to their synopti-
con. However, they are worried about the feelings of
the people they know from real life that appear in their
blog. Correspondingly, their blogging has to proceed
with some caution: details are omitted and identities
concealed. Not just anything can be exposed.
There are several varieties of this concern. To begin
with, bloggers may fear that their acquaintances might
become oﬀended or feel compromised. ‘Miss Xombie’,
blogging since mid-2007, states this as follows:
I am constantly worried about backlash from
family members, even though I’ve not written
anything even remotely unﬂattering.
Disclaimer: If you know me in real life, or even
think you know me, if I’m related to you, either by
blood or by marriage, please don’t take the words I
place here personally.
[…] If it is [about you], you will know I am refer-
ring to you, because I will have brought it up to
you, someplace other than here.
(disclaimer on her blog, dated 13 January 2008, re-
trieved fromhttp://missxombie.com/category/xombie)
Out of this concern, bloggers sometimes require
known persons from real life to make themselves
known. They want to know their audience from real
life so they can adapt their entries accordingly.
Athena warned her readers to think ﬁrst:
If you know me personally […], please consider
whether or not you really want to read what I write.
[…] some of the things I reveal may or may not be
things you want to know. […] I know the risk
involved with everyone I’ve ever known possibly
reading it. I’m ﬁnewith that. I just want tomake sure
you are too. […] If you do make the choice to read,
please drop me a line and let me know.
(‘disclaimer of sorts’ on her blog, retrieved from
http://www.lexxicon.net; now deleted, but quoted
in Sorapure 2003, p. 11)
Another more unusual variety of this worry is that
online diarists may feel uncomfortable about the fact
that people they know read their intimacies, but not
vice versa. As a result, the balance of intimacies
between them and the people close to them might
become disturbed. (S)he comes to feel that, in a
curiously inverted sense, these lurkers intrude upon
her/his privacy. Ariel Meadow Stallings, who has
been keeping a blog called Electrolicious from
the year 2000 onwards, expresses this concern
perceptively:
If I know you in real life, and you read this blog, you
really need to make the eﬀort to communicate with
me. [bold in original] For some strange reason I’m
ﬁne with people I don’t know lurking in the side-
lines, reading about this strange woman on the
interweb [sic]. I don’t know them, they don’t know
me. But if I know you in real life, your right to lurk
is unequivocally revoked.
People I know lurking on Electrolicious contrib-
utes to this strange feeling that there are a lot of
people in my ‘‘real life’’ who know me, but don’t
give me the opportunity to know them. […]
If I know you, you read Electrolicious, and you
don’t communicate with me, you’re committing a
strange sort of emotional vampirism.
(post called One-Way Mirror, dated 25 October
2003; retrieved from http://electrolicious.com/
2003/10/oneway_mirror)
In this ﬁrst approach to privacy the whole world out
there is always welcome, both anonymous and non-
2 It cannot be ruled out, of course, that further research
will uncover other approaches to the public–private
distinction.
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anonymous. The diaristic synopticon is declared open
to all. Trust, as evidenced in the entrusting of inti-
macies, equally applies to all, as ex ante assumed
trust – albeit that non-anonymous readers may have
to fulﬁl the extra condition of notiﬁcation in order to
(continue to) earn this trust.
Second approach to privacy
A second, quite diﬀerent approach to the tension
between public and private is to try and exclude
from one’s blog known persons from real life. If you
happen to know the blogger, you are refused entry
to the synopticon. Explicit messages on the diary
(under headings like ‘please read’, ‘read ﬁrst’) warn
relatives, friends, and acquaintances to stay away. If
these want to continue reading the blog nevertheless,
they should notify the author. So these bloggers
explicitly entrust their intimacies only to anonymous
strangers, to people who do not know them in real
life (cf. several instances in Lejeune 2000, for
example p. 326; McNeill 2003, pp. 37–39; Sorapure
2003, pp. 11–12).
Two examples may illustrate this approach.
Trance, in her TranceJen journal, keeps her advice to
readers very short: ‘Think. If you know me in real life,
you shouldn’t be here’ [bold in original] (retrieved
from http://trancescrap.diaryland.com; now deleted,
but quoted in Sorapure 2003, p. 11). Another more
polite and more elaborate example is provided by the
blog ‘Life & Times of a History PhD Student’ (all
quotations below from the entry called Please
Read, dated 23 April 2007, retrieved from http://
lifexhistory.wordpress.com/about). Under the head-
ing ‘Please Read’, the author informs her readers that
[…] it is certainly possible for people who know me
to stumble upon this blog. If you do know me,
either in real life, or through online correspondence
and friendship via the blogosphere, please keep in
mind that I would like to keep this blog as gener-
ally anonymous.
Subsequently, people who know her are urged not to
mention her name, place of residence, or university
aﬃliation when sending back comments on her blog,
nor to pass on information from the blog to anyone
else in the university. Moreover, ‘if you do know me
‘‘in real life’’ […], please do me the courtesy of asking
to read my blog or refrain from reading my blog all
together’. At the end, she warns that ‘a violation of
any of the above will at the very least lead me to
delete your comments. I also reserve the right to
block your comments in the future, though’. So this
blog is preferably for anonymous visitors only (even
pure Internet contacts are excluded), and non-
anonymous visitors should explicitly ask for possible
permission to read.
Such diarists, then, want to cordon oﬀ their virtual
diary from their real life (or any other existing circle
for that matter, whether real or virtual). Their ano-
nymity, which facilitates the exposure of intimacies,
should be guaranteed at all times. By introducing
these rules the blogger seeks to protect his/her own
privacy inside the blog’s community. So paradoxi-
cally, this kind of blogging may at ﬁrst sight look like
an open invitation, but, in fact, intimacies are prop-
erly entrusted only to virtual, anonymous partici-
pants. Ex ante assumed trust is involved. People other
than this, the ‘non-strangers’, are met with utter sus-
picion and – indeed – distrust. This distrust towards
them is inferred from their known identities.
On reﬂection, this is not such an ‘odd desire’ as it
might seem (to Sorapure at least: Sorapure 2003,
p. 12). After all, many of us maintain a portfolio of
memberships of a wide range of communities that
often we do not want to intermingle. We may well feel
that intimacies can be shared with our therapy group
and when confessing in church, but not with our
baseball team or our colleagues from work. Such
reasoning corresponds with Rachels’ conception of
privacy, referred to above.
Third approach to privacy
A third and ﬁnal approach to the tension between
private and public is more radical: it seeks to abandon
the distinction altogether (cf. discussion in Serfaty
2004, pp. 90–91). There is nothing to hide, anything
of a personal nature can be exposed to anyone. In
fact, the whole notion of privacy is declared obsolete.
The diaristic synopticon is declared open to all, no
permission to enter is required from anyone. Ex ante
assumed trust towards people in cyberspace is fully
re-established.
An early example of this radical stance is Tracy
Lee. She started blogging in 1995, determined to
include both texts about and erotic pictures of herself.
What would make my site diﬀerent from the other
journals out there already would be that I wouldn’t
hold anything back. Good times, bad, arguments,
sex – whatever was happening in my life that I’d
normally write about in my personal journal would
go up on the website.




With a similar but more elaborate vision, Carolyn
Burke started her online diary a year later.
I believed strongly in the power of good that results
from free expression, free information exchange, and
open and honest communication between people. […]
An online diary, a place that exposed private
mental spaces to everyone’s scrutiny seemed like a
social obligation to me. I felt at the time that I
could give back to society something important: a
snapshot of what a person is like on the inside. This
is something that we don’t get access to in face to
face, social society. Our intimacies are hidden, and
speaking of them in public is taboo.
I questioned the privacy taboo. I disagreed with it.
I exposed my private and intimate world to public
awareness.
[…] I wanted everyone in the world to expose their
inner lives to everyone else. Complete open honest
people. What a great and ideal world would result.
(interview from 2000; retrieved from http://www.
diaryhistoryproject.com/recollections/1995_01_03.
html)
A German blogger, Tobi, espouses the same vision in
a ‘petition’ for eliminating the option of private
weblogs (i.e., with restricted access) at Antville.org:
[…] a private weblog as such is a paradoxon.
Perhaps the most unambiguous diﬀerence with a
diary: one does not put one’s own diary on a heap
of journals, books and manuscripts in a cafe, free
for the taking.
[…] And aren’t weblogs more like an antipode to
the diary? The publication of what has been
unjustly kept from the public sphere and not the
falsifying self-expropriation of the private? The
restoration of a public sphere where the diary
belongs but does not end up any more? The
retaking of the public sphere and not the selling-
oﬀ – no: the shrinking of the intimate sphere that
has been violated anyway?
There is no such thing as private publicity.
OR:
There is no such thing as public privacy.
[my translation of this German post; last 2 English
sentences in original]
(post dated 13 May 2003; retrieved from http://
tobi.antville.org/stories/380524/)
So, as an interesting aside, contrary to the usual
interpretation that considers diaristic blogs to be the
direct successor of classical diaries (e.g., Serfaty
2004), Tobi turns the relationship around and
argues for the inherently public character of such
blogs.
This third kind of exhibitionism can be seen to be
more empowering than the ﬁrst two approaches. Not
only are such diaries a synopticon produced by the
authors themselves, they also have the broader soci-
etal impact of being directed against the panopticist
tendencies of our time. By practising total transpar-
ency, the societal gaze is returned. In the words of
Koskela (2004): by confronting the regime of control
and the regime of shame (as embedded in the concept
of privacy), Big Brother surveillance is subverted and
potentially rendered meaningless.3
This subversive character of ‘extreme’ blogging has
not gone unnoticed in blogging circles. The link
between total transparency and honesty on the one
hand, and societal subversion on the other, is dis-
cussed by Miles Hochstein. He keeps a diary ﬁlled
with text and images (going back to his youth), meant
to ‘document’ his life in full.
In the 21st century we are witness to ‘‘cam-girls’’
(and camguys? and autodocumenters?) who live
their lives online, and to bloggers who report their
daily activities and musings. The idea of not being
hidden, or of breaking down the normal barriers to
privacy, is in play. What they may share with this
website is an interest in being rebelliously indiﬀer-
ent to observation. We are all engaged in resisting
the idea that we are disempowered by being seen,
or that we can only ﬁnd empowerment by being
private. Some of us even suspect that the need for
privacy plays right into the dominance structures
that are predicated upon one way observation. We
are perhaps ﬁghting the use of observation as a
technique of power, by claiming the status of
‘‘being observed’’ as a way of empowering our-
selves, and thus of dismantling the use of one way
observation to dominate and shame and control.
(preamble to his diary entitled Documented Life,
available at http://documentedlife.com/log; pre-
amble now deleted, but quoted in Serfaty 2004,
p. 89)4
As a corollary, the radical consequences of such
‘extreme’ empowering exhibitionism should be noted.
For one thing, above I remarked that ex ante trust in
visitors to the blog had been re-established. On closer
3 This third kind of exhibitionism is actually the main
focus of discussion in Koskela (2004). By distinguishing
three approaches to the public–private distinction, I in fact
propose a broader interpretation of empowering exhibi-
tionism than Koskela.
4 Immediately, of course, the question imposes itself
whether Hochstein might possibly just be echoing some
phrases from Koskela (2004)? Or is it the other way round?
I have not been able to detect an answer to these questions.
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inspection, however, it is more accurate to say that
assuming trust is no longer needed, while trust no
longer applies. Those who plead for total transpar-
ency, ipso facto have nothing to lose. They do not feel
vulnerable when exposing intimate details of their
lives to the public gaze. Without vulnerability there is
no perception of risk and blogging is no longer an act
of implied trust. Connected to this, the exhibitionism
involved changes in a subtle fashion. Exhibition of
the details of one’s life is no longer accompanied by
shame, no inner resistance has to be overcome. In
that sense, although we as onlookers may still feel
ourselves to be voyeurs, the bloggers themselves are
proper exhibitionists no longer.
Blogging in practice
Blogging about one’s life may be a hard game to play.
Whatever their conceptions of privacy, its practitio-
ners have to face formidable obstacles. To begin with,
virtual strangers may cause trouble. Bloggers may
assume readers to be worthy of their intimacies – but
not all of them conform to this assumption. Harass-
ing and ‘trolling’ by complete strangers are common
phenomena in these circles. In response to nasty
comments, many bloggers have to use the delete
options.
More generally, blogging codes of ethics are
sometimes proposed to handle the matter. Let us for
example have a look at the recent discussion that Tim
O’Reilly initiated on his blog O’Reilly Radar, on
8 April 2007, about a code of conduct that should
restore ‘civility’ in the blogosphere (see the report
on http://radar.oreilly.com/archives/2007/04/draft_
bloggers_1.html). Its main clauses are that unac-
ceptable content will not be posted but deleted,
anonymous comments will be refused, and trolls will
not be responded to – all at the discretion of the blog
owner. This aroused a storm of comment, much of
which carried the same nasty tone that the code was
intended to ﬁlter out. Of course, all proposed mea-
sures of ‘comment management’ nibble at the edges
of public access. ‘Censorship’ – towards the world
outside at least – is re-entering the scene.
Secondly, people who populate one’s real life may
become a source of anguish and trouble. Whatever
one’s conception of privacy and associated synopticist
regime chosen, problems are bound to arise. Col-
leagues and superiors from work may discover that
they appear in diaries on theNet, and not be too happy
about it. Ultimately, people may even get ﬁred for it.
Several incidents have been reported of bloggers losing
their jobs for this reason (cf. for example the case of
Heather Armstrong; see http://www.dooce.com).
Furthermore, one’s friends and relatives may be
embarrassed to ﬁgure openly in diaries, and react
accordingly. Even someone like Carolyn Burke,
mentioned above, who is a proponent of total
transparency, felt compelled to stop blogging for a
while for this reason:
Three years into my diary, I stopped writing pub-
licly. There were troubles in my life that couldn’t be
placed online without serious repercussions. […]
When they resolved a year later, I began exposing
my writings again. I truly regret hiding that way. I
felt that I let my dream to be brutally open and
honest down.
(interview from 2000; retrieved from http://wwww.
diaryhistoryproject.com/recollections/1995_01_03.
html)
Friends and relatives may also intrude in diaries, not
so much while feeling embarrassed, but simply by
commenting on the entries. This may shred the ano-
nymity that the author imagined (s)he enjoyed. A
case in point is Tracy Lee, who, like Carolyn Burke,
initially believed in total transparency. After 2 years
she had to concede that she was vulnerable after all,
and decided to shut down her diary (reopening it later
with restricted access only).
In the end my idea of being totally honest started
to backﬁre as more and more people in my real life
became aware of the journal. I didn’t mind if
friends read it, but I did mind when they read it
and commented on it to me. When what anonymity
I had in the journal that allowed me to be free and
write unrestricted disappeared then it stopped
being enjoyable and I shut it down.
(interview from 2000; retrieved from http://www.
diaryhistoryproject.com/recollections/1995_09_02.
html)
She also recalls how a total stranger approached her
in a nightclub and told her that he had seen her
naked. This was an additional reason to stop her
public presence. Virtual strangers may unexpectedly
turn up in real life too.
All this is to show that intimate blogging in the
public gaze, whether in a more ‘cautious’ or in a more
‘extreme’ fashion, is not without its troubles. Notions
of privacy, of the line between public and private, are
being put to the test all the time. Virtual strangers
may turn out to be nasty trolls, and people one knows
from real life may be experienced as intruding in a
variety of ways. As a result, bloggers may feel forced
to reconsider their original conceptions of how much
intimacy blogging in the open can bear. Henceforth
their diaristic sites may become less publicized, inti-
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macies omitted from the entries, and/or technological
measures taken to ‘manage’ one’s privacy (censorship
of comments, password restrictions on entry; cf.
above). At any rate, living on the web will be most
diﬃcult for those who cherish the conception of total
transparency and attendant invulnerability. The
chances are that, after a while, they will feel forced to
acknowledge that vulnerabilities are involved after
all. They will then have to retrace their steps and at
least adopt a more traditional notion of privacy.
Conclusions
Assuming, not inferring trust is an intriguing mech-
anism to generate trust. While discussions about it go
back as far as Niklas Luhmann, it has only recently
been put on the research agenda by a series of
scholars, especially those studying the Internet. My
main purpose has been to draw attention to diaristic
blogging: most authors, their identity hardly con-
cealed, expose the intimacies of their lives squarely to
the public at large. I have argued that this voluntary
exposure cannot be explained by the usual mecha-
nism of inferring trustworthiness. Instead, authors
simply assume that visitors to their blogs can be
entrusted with their intimacies. And this gamble does
indeed seem to pay oﬀ: many visitors do return
respectful comments. How is this to be explained? It
has been argued that authors, sitting safely behind
their screens, proceed to trust a generalized other
(one-to-many communication). It is up to the
(chance) visitors whether or not they are amused or
even enchanted by the blog’s entries. If they are, they
may feel bound to return sympathetic comments to
their author; if they are not, they may feel bound, at
any rate, to refrain from abuse. So in eﬀect, the
normative power of assuming trust is twofold.
At the same time, this phenomenon of blogging
about one’s life in (near) total transparency has been
connected to current debates about our ‘voyeur
nation’, our ‘viewer society’. Voyeurism combined
with exhibitionism are the deﬁning characteristics of
our current media experiences. They are to be inter-
preted as a ‘perverted’ reaction to the ever-increasing
erosion of our privacy in this information society. It
has been argued that blogging, by contrast, is a form
of direct expression of the self, to be denoted as
‘empowering exhibitionism’. The synopticon envis-
aged may be threefold: one open to all, in which
accommodation of the sensitivities of known people
from real life is the main source of concern; one that
only welcomes virtual strangers, so known people
from real life are preferably excluded; and one open
to all, in which total transparency is the norm and
concern for – anyone’s – privacy is declared obsolete.
In the last type of blog the gaze of surveillance is
proudly resisted and returned; our panopticist society
is targeted as well. As regards trust, a notable result
of this interpretation of blogging as empowering
exhibitionism is that online diarists turn out not
always to assume trust indiscriminately. In the second
type of synopticon, separated from real life, persons
whom the blogger knows in real life are explicitly met
with distrust from the very start – inferred this time
from their real-life identities.
Finally, blogging has been shown to be a diﬃcult life
form on the Internet. In practice, not only anonymous
trolls may disturb a blogger’s community; known
people from real life may also feel embarrassed and
interfere accordingly, or simply shred whatever ano-
nymity was left to the author. As a result, bloggers
often feel forced to become less frank and less honest,
to ‘censor’ incoming comments, and to reinstall pass-
word restrictions on entry. This is a dangerous devel-
opment, while it may undermine the very assumption
of generalized trust upon which the whole phenome-
non of blogging is based.
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